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Abstract—In standard Turing test, a machine has to
prove its humanness to the judges. By successfully imi-
tating a thinking entity such as a human, this machine
then proves that it can also think. However, many ob-
jections are raised against the validity of this argument.
Such objections claim that Turing test is not a tool to
demonstrate existence of general intelligence or thinking
activity. In this light, alternatives to Turing test are to
be investigated. Self-recognition tests applied on animals
through mirrors appear to be a viable alternative to
demonstrate the existence of a type of general intelligence.
Methodology here constructs a textual version of the
mirror test by placing the chatbot (in this context) as the
one and only judge to figure out whether the contacted
one is an other, a mimicker, or oneself in an unsupervised
manner. This textual version of the mirror test is objective,
self-contained, and is mostly immune to objections raised
against the Turing test. Any chatbot passing this textual
mirror test should have or acquire a thought mechanism
that can be referred to as the inner-voice, answering the
original and long lasting question of Turing ”Can machines
think?” in a constructive manner.
Index Terms—Turing test, Mirror test, Self-recognition,
Artificial intelligence, Chatbots
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1950, Alan Turing investigated the question,
’Can machines think?’. However, instead of provid-
ing a concrete definition of ’thinking’, he replaced
the question with a test called the Imitation Game
claiming that a machine passing this test can then
be regarded as a thinking entity [1].
Originally being a party game, the Imitation
Game (IG) is played with a man, a woman, and
a judge whose gender is not important as depicted
in Fig. 1a. Through written communication, both
subjects aim to convince the judge that he/she is the
woman and the other is not, hence the man needs
to imitate a woman. Turing then replaces the man
with a machine as in Fig. 1b and wonders whether
the success rate would change or not. In the final
version of the game, a man now takes the place of
the woman as in Fig. 1c.
It is not very clear which version (Fig. 1b or
Fig. 1c) is meant by IG throughout the literature,
but it is generally assumed that the Turing Test
(TT) in its standard interpretation takes the form
of Fig. 1d in which the machine’s ability to imitate
a human, instead of its ability to imitate a woman
is measured. It is still in question why IG Turing
originally suggested is gender-based or whether IG
is totally equivalent to TT. Readers might refer to [2]
for a sound discussion on these issues. Note that,
Turing himself later drops gender-related issues and
poses the question ’Can machines communicate in
natural language in a manner indistinguishable from
that of a human being?’, thus places the Turing Test
as in Fig. 1d into central attention [1]. Therefore,
throughout this article, by TT this standard form
will be assumed.
A. Analysis of Turing Test
TABLE I: Summary of the extent of mainstream AI
Human Intelligence Rationality
Reasoning Thinking humanly (TH) Thinking rationally (TR)
Behavior Acting humanly (AH) Acting rationally (AR)
The analysis of TT presented here is not by any
means a complete one. In fact, an analysis based
mostly on the objections raised against TT is given.
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2(a) Preliminary of the Imitation Game (b) First version of the Imitation Game
(c) Second version of the Imitation Game (d) Standard version: The Turing Test
Fig. 1: The distinction between the Imitation Game and the Turing Test
In Table I, TT mostly refers to behavioral aspect of
human intelligence, but in fact targets the reasoning
domain. In other words, TT claims that fulfilling
AH implies the existence of a thinking mechanism,
namely TH or TR or both. This table is visited often
throughout this subsection [3].
1) Consistent machines, Go¨del, and paraconsis-
tent logic: As built on logic, conventional machines
are bound by the Go¨del’s Theorem which states
that in consistent logical systems of enough power,
certain statements cannot be proved or disproved
within the system [4]. Thus, they are bound to be
limited to an extent. On the other hand, humans
with some room for inconsistency or irrationality,
have different characteristics. Implications of these
issues on machine thought is further discussed by
Lucas [5]. However, with introduction and mechani-
cal realization of paraconsistent logic, which allows
inconsistencies in a controlled and discriminating
way, it is probable that such machines can then
reason much like humans do [6], [7]. Note that,
modeling generic human reasoning mechanism ex-
actly in terms of paraconsistent logic is perhaps
still an open problem. Then assuming it can be
solved, referring to Table I, for artificial machines
both TH and TR seem satisfiable. This conclusion is
important with respect to TT as TT itself claims that
TH and TR are satisfiable (i.e. by fulfilling AH).
2) Machines that cheat, Chinese room, and re-
animation: In Turing Test, there is no restriction
on the design of the involved machines. There-
fore, machines can cheat (i.e. hide their default
behavior) and disguise themselves in a human-like
appearance. In Table I, this corresponds to the
fact that although AH does not hold in reality,
the machine can trick the judge believing in that
AH holds. Then by fulfilling AH, the machine can
erroneously pass TT. A related argument is given
by John Searle through his Chinese room example,
claiming that external behavior cannot be used to
determine whether a machine is actually thinking
in real-time or reanimating an already thought and
saved process (created by someone else) [8]. This
translates to the fact that, although neither of TH,
TR, AH, or AR hold directly for the machine in
question, it can simulate such processes (acquired
from someone else) without actually having created
them in the first place, working much like a virtual
machine. Note that the capacity of such a machine
is then bounded by the processes it has or can
acquire, and thus its intelligence is not defined by
its own mental abilities, but through the abilities of
its acquaintances.
3) Uncreative and hardcoded machines: Having
roots in Lady Lovelace’s objection, machines are
generally assumed to be incapable of originating
3anything, doing anything new, or surprising us. Such
acts most probably require learning and creativity
besides keeping a set of logical rules. However, at
current stage of AI research, machines (or artificial
agents) are capable of learning and also under-
going tasks that require creativity [9], [10]. On
the other extreme, Ned Block proposes a machine
that can pass TT, without any significant infor-
mation processing, but through being extensively
hardcoded [11]. This hypothetical machine stores all
the possible sensible conversations in its memory,
and then answers the judges just by simple lookups.
Although such a machine may not be possible in
practice, it is theoretically possible. This machine’s
intelligence is analogously equivalent to that of
a jukebox, but it can pass TT, thus TT cannot
be a proper test to measure intelligence. Block in
fact claims the opposite of Turing, namely acting
humanly does not necessarily imply the existence
of any thinking activity, as in theory generic human
behavior can be hardcoded into the machine. In
short, TT is deemed to be a behaviorist approach
not capable of detecting the extent of internal in-
formation processing. Therefore, alternatives that
can detect the existence of sophisticated internal
mechanisms (such as capability of learning and
general problem solving) must be preferred.
4) Human intelligence vs. general intelligence:
It is asserted that the IG (or the TT) examines
machines in terms of human-specific intelligence,
instead of on the grounds of a general one [12]. This
issue is investigated in detail when the concept of
subcognition is introduced in Sect. I-B1 and is also
revisited when information theoretic alternatives of
TT are discussed in Sect. I-B3.
5) Impairment of judges and confederate effect:
Apart from the philosophical aspects of TT, involve-
ment of judges is another issue from a practical
perspective. As human beings, judges can make
mistakes, cannot be totally objective and can even
be manipulated towards an unexpected decision [1],
[13], [14]. Moreover, human participants may fre-
quently be demotivated to act as themselves, caus-
ing them to be incorrectly labeled as machines,
such peculiarity being named as the confederate
effect [15]. In short, these all are repercussions of
TT not being a self-contained test. There exists an
external dependency on the performance of judges
and also human subjects, thus TT cannot truly be
accurate or objective.
B. Alternatives to Turing Test
Alternatives to TT are investigated under three
headings. Firstly, alternatives that provide valu-
able analytical insight are given. Then, higher-order
generalizations of TT are discussed. Finally and
most importantly, more formal information theoretic
alternatives are listed, leading the way to self-
recognition as an alternative.
1) Alternatives as analytic probes: Considering
the possibility of a random state finite automaton
(FSA) to generate proper English sentences (by
extreme luck) enough to pass the Turing test, Kugel
introduced a theoretical game consisting of infinitely
many rounds [16]. The main motivation behind is
the fact that not only FSAs but even Turing ma-
chines should definitely be regarded inferior com-
pared to mental capabilities of humans. Therefore,
the possibility of a random FSA being able to pass
the Turing test in theory is disturbing to many.
Through introduction of another hypothetical test,
called the Seagull Test, the limits of Turing test
is further challenged. A Seagull test measures a
subject’s capability of flight. The subject will pass
the test if its flying characteristic is indistinguishable
from that of a seagull in the radar. The Seagull test
cannot be fulfilled by helicopters, bats, or beetles, or
many other flying things alike. Thus, this is directly
analogous to Turing test’s detection of intelligence
practiced by a human being. Further through the
introduction of the subcognitive questions, French
claims that to imitate a human, a machine needs to
experience the world as a human does (i.e. through
sensing organs) for a considerable period of time,
otherwise it will not be able to answer questions
related to special physical experience that can only
be acquired by a human being. This is due to the
fact that, while TT is a test for human-like intelli-
gence and experience, just as the Seagull test is for
detecting Seagull-like flight characteristics [17].
2) Generalizations: Based on the subcognition
concept, it is natural to extend TT into the physical
domain as proposed by Harnad [18] referred to as
Total Turing Test. In this physical version, judge
can also directly, visually, tactically examine the two
candidates. Harder extensions referred to as T4 and
T5 are also discussed in [19], but all these general-
izations aim at testing human-specific intelligence or
functionality of machines, not providing a universal
measure for intelligence or capability. Therefore,
4information theoretic approaches to defining intel-
ligence are discussed next to provide a domain
independent discussion.
3) Information theoretic alternatives: A conven-
tional perspective in this domain favors inductive
learning capacity as a general and fundamental
intelligence sign. Through certain analogies it can
be claimed that inductive learning is tightly related
to compression ability, thus it is possible to draw
parallels between intelligence and algorithmic in-
formation theory [20].
In a similar study, comprehension (as the out-
come of a successful inductive inference process)
is chosen as the fundamental sign of intelligence.
Formalizing this ability, authors arrive at what is
called the C-test, defined in pure computational
terms applicable to both humans and non-humans.
In this way, they are also able to establish a con-
nection between information theoretic concepts and
classical IQ tests [21].
Recent understanding suggests that a compression
or induction test is possibly limited to define the
standards of general intelligence. The key idea is to
see intelligence as the mean (or weighted average)
performance of an agent in all the possible environ-
ments [22], including active environments. In this
regard, the agent does not only require inductive
abilities to understand the environment, but also
needs planning abilities to use such understanding
effectively. These modifications put focus on con-
cepts such as perception, attention, and memory
besides inductive skills, and thus generalizes C-
test. Following this logic, a universal definition of
intelligence is given as ”the ability to adapt to a wide
range of environments”, both referring to internal
and external mechanisms of an agent. Although
theoretically sound, developing a practical test to
satisfy such an extensive measure for all possible in-
telligence forms accurately and objectively is nearly
impossible.
II. SELF-RECOGNITION AS AN ALTERNATIVE
At this point, it is now most appropriate to intro-
duce our perspective on this issue. Perhaps, instead
of trying to attain a definition for the supreme
form of intelligence and an ultimate test for it,
trying to catch the glimpse of general intelligence
will be far more beneficial as a cornerstone. It is
a common convention to regard human beings as
the most intelligent forms known to exist. Forcing
machines to reach this (highest-known) intelligence
threshold without setting any other reasonable lower
milestones seems to be unreasonable. Assuming that
species observed as the most intelligent ones of all
have the ability of self-recognition in a mirror [23],
[24], [25], such tests and their variants can then be
proper candidates for catching glimpses of general
intelligence in a self-contained and a truly objective
manner, immune to most of the objections raised
against the Turing Test and its generalizations, set-
ting a more reasonable milestone for machines to
reach.
A. Self-recognition in living beings
Self-recognition and idea of self is special and
unique for some mammals like great apes, humans,
orcas, dolphins and elephants. Also, there is only
one non-mammal animal, European Magpies, that
is capable of self-recognition. First usage of ”the
Mirror Test” as a tool to test self-recognition ap-
pears in 1970, introduced by Gordon Gallup [26].
Basically, a test subject is marked with an odorless
dye, where it cannot see directly (forehead, ear etc.).
Then, its behavior is observed to see whether it will
be aware that the dye is on its own body part. For
instance, one of the common behavior that indicates
self-recognition is poking the marking on its own
body. Of course, this behavior needs to happen
while observing the reflection. However, the test
raised some questions and received critics. Readers
may refer to [27] for more detailed information on
the upcoming discussion about self-recognition and
interpreting others’ behaviors.
The test was not robust enough. Gorillas, for in-
stance, failed on the test because their basic instincts
dictate that eye contact is an aggressive gesture.
Hence, they avoid looking at the reflection in the
face. Other than this, some of the primates need
a transitional period before self-recognizing them-
selves in the mirror (like systematically exploring
the body parts that cannot be seen directly). These
types of problems complicate the application pro-
cedure of the test. Nevertheless, the main question
was Is Mirror Self-Recognition enough to say the
subject is intelligent?. An early attempt of an answer
came from Gordon Gallup again. According to
Gallup, there was a link between MSR and ability to
interpret others’ mental states. In short, he predicted
5a developmental correlation between presence of
mirror self-recognition and social strategies based
on the idea of self, such as empathy, pretending, and
deception, to be reached with some cognitive devel-
opment after presence of mirror self-recognition. To
best of our knowledge, it can be thought as a door
that leads to more complex cognitive abilities. It
should also be noted that, mirror self-recognition
presence is needed for more complex cognitive
abilities but it is not a certainty that an animal with
such ability will develop more complex cognitive
abilities ever [28]. Most relevant to the methodology
that will be presented in Section III, self-recognition
studies in robots are to be discussed next to gain
further insight.
B. Robotic self-recognition
In one of the earliest studies towards robotic self-
recognition, through learning a characteristic time
window between the initiation of motor movement
and the perception of actual motion, authors demon-
strate a certain level of self-recognition in robots,
reminiscent of a rather incomplete model for self-
awareness present in human infants [29]. However,
in case of co-occurence of very similar time delay
characteristics for two different agents, such system
will fail as there is then little chance of discrim-
ination. After all, motion time delay models are
certainly not as unique as fingerprints, namely two
robots of the same kind from the same manufacturer
will surely have very similar time delay models.
In a follow-up study from the same research
group, the robot is now able to learn a more formal
Bayesian model that relates its own motor activity
with perceived motion. The importance of this study
lies in the fact that mirror self-recognition is per-
formed through a purely statistical kinesthetic-visual
matching mechanism, without any significant social
aspect. This is a challenge to the viewpoint that a
certain level of social understanding is necessary
for mirror self-recognition. Authors further claim
that mirror test may not be about self-awareness or
theory of mind at all, but merely a test of an agent’s
ability to adapt to new kinds of visual feedback,
but such an ability might be related to intelligence,
mind, self-awareness concepts in a self-referential
way (recalling the rather synchronous definition of
general intelligence as the ability to adapt to a wide
range of environments as given earlier).
Fig. 2: Visual version of the proposed methodology
Perhaps the most promising way to investigate
self-recognition issue, both in practical and theoret-
ical terms, is through studying mirror neurons that
can identify actions of either self or others [30].
Namely, such audiovisual mirror neurons activate
when the corresponding action is performed, its
related sound is heard, or it is seen. A recent
study successfully incorporates such findings and
develops a brain-inspired model for robotic self-
consciousness [31]. However, common conception
is that mirror neurons alone are not sufficient, but
necessary for the ability of self-recognition in a
mirror, as monkeys possess such neurons but cannot
pass the mirror test. Furthermore, a simple consid-
eration suggests that mirror neurons can be used
for implementing a communication system based
on gestures, as in a sign language, thus introducing
language into our research domain. With all these
considerations, it is time to present our proposed
methodology which conceptualizes the mirror test
by providing it in a textual form.
III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
The main contribution of this paper lies in the
conceptual generalization of the conventional mirror
test, namely going from Fig. 2 to Fig. 3. To be
able to make meaningful analysis, a chatbot replaces
a robot in this context. Performed actions now
correspond to output sent, and observing performed
actions then correspond to the input received in the
textual/conceptual version. According to this con-
ceptual generalization, there is no restriction on the
form of the agent as long as it has an input/output
interface and an embodiment in any form. The need
6for an embodiment besides an input/output interface
is discussed later on in the text.
The proposed methodology consists of 4 stages as
depicted in Fig. 3. For simplicity, a turn-based chat-
ting session is assumed as usual for all stages. The
first (leftmost) stage is the default (and convention-
ally the only) case considered in a chatting session.
Chatbot A sends its output to chatbot B and receives
B’s output through its input. As conventionally the
only case, chatbot A is aware of the fact that it is
communicating with another entity (whether it be
another chatbot or a human), and possibly has no
motivation to think otherwise. Note that, in nearly
all of the cases relating two distinct entities, there
exists an intermediate communication channel, but
is discarded here for simplicity. Then in simplistic
terms, in Stage 1, A and B depict instances of two
distinct programs with a corresponding input/output
relation as necessary.
As the first effective stage of the proposed
methodology, the next stage replaces B with another
instance of A, called the mimicker of A. Therefore,
in this case there are two instances of the same
program talking to each other. So the question then
is: Will the agent A be able to recognize such a
case and figure out (in an unsupervised manner) that
the entity contacted is in fact an instance of itself
instead of being an instance of a distinct program?
At this point, referring back to the visual version
will be helpful. Since implementing such a stage for
living beings is impossible in practice, a theoretical
consideration is taken. Assume that there is an exact
replica of the subject, and such replica can mimic
any action taken in real-time without any delay.
What will be the consequences when these two
entities face each other? Interestingly, if the subject
contains non-determinism, such mimicry will break
at some point. Will such mimicry continue on till
infinity otherwise? Not necessarily. Although these
are instances created from the same source, they
may be subject to change as interaction goes on
and such change may differ for each. After all they
are not exactly the same, at least they have different
coordinates in the system they belong to (consider a
system in which a change mechanism that depends
on the coordinates of the individuals exists)
Going back to the conceptual version, if deter-
minism and no-change policies hold, A will receive
responses from its mimicker, exactly the responses
it would give. Hypothetically, A can first send the
Fig. 3: Textual/Conceptual generalization
query to itself (an ability to be formalized later in
Stage 4) and then to the mimicker, and can check
for the equality of those two responses. However, it
seems as if such procedure should be repeated till
infinity for a perfect mimicker to be detected and
this dilemma paves way to the next stage.
The third stage is the stage that conceptualizes the
mirror test as depicted in the third column of Fig. 3,
in which an input/output redirector is conceptually
used as a mirror. In fact, from A’s perspective, such
stage initially seems indistinguishable from Stage
2. In visual version, a perfect mimicker behind a
glass, and a reflection in a mirror rather sound as
two observably equivalent scenarios. Then, how is
it possible that a human or a capable animal is able
to definitely grasp the concept of reflection without
needing to test till infinity as Stage 2 demands?
When and how does the necessary ’click’ happen?
Equally applicable to both visual and textual,
such ’click’ happens when the subject figures out
that in fact there are not two separate entities, but
these two entities actually refer to the same physical
space, namely to the subject itself, rather it be
the body or the address space respectively. This is
rather equivalent to figuring out the principles of
a mirror or an input/output redirection. Namely in
textual version, it is equivalent to figuring out that
the contacted entity is not an actual entity but a
reference that rather redirects to subject’s own input.
Note that, how this realization takes place is rather
a deeper issue that has partly been addressed in
Section II for the visual version. Through Stage
74, the final stage, these deeper issues are to be
introduced for the textual version this time.
Note that, up to this stage, input/output relations
are assumed to be established through enforcement
instead of choice. As an example, an online chatbot
is hopelessly forced to chat with anyone that con-
nects to its interface and has to respond somehow to
each query that stranger sends. Similarly, in Stage
2, a mimicker is instantiated and the necessary
input/output relations are established without ques-
tion, and such procedure also holds for Stage 3. In
that sense, Stage 4 is actually a symbolic stage in
which the agent A is depicted to have redirected
its output to its own input, without needing an
additional redirector as in Stage 3. A deep question
then is: Will an agent passing Stage 3 be able to
configure itself as depicted in Stage 4? Possible
implications of this and related issues are to be
discussed next.
A. Implications of textual/conceptual self-
recognition
The original visual version has partially been dis-
cussed in Sect. II, but there is more to be mentioned.
Passing the mirror test for the first time possibly
grants the subject the ability to virtually place the
observer (i.e. the virtual eye) in a 3rd person manner,
providing a form of perspective-taking. In other
words, a mirror (theoretically directable towards
anywhere) provides a different viewing perspective
as if the subject is virtually somewhere else, or
equivalently granting the subject to both observe
and also transmit its actions to otherwise inacces-
sible portions of the world. Similarly, through an
input/output redirector it is possible to bind the
input/output of the subject theoretically anywhere
in memory.
It is still in question whether passing Stage 3
automatically grants the agent the ability to redirect
its output as desired without needing any tool,
whether it be to its own input or to somewhere else.
The validity of such a possible implication should be
carefully considered in a formal manner. However,
assuming that the agent can redirect its output to its
own input, whether it be through an internal mecha-
nism or an external one as depicted in Stage 4, then
this can serve as a formal geometrical definition of
the inner-voice concept. The implications of having
an inner-voice are truly far-reaching in return [32],
[33].
In a related manner, if an agent is able to consider
actions without being actually performed and how
they would be observed even in the absence of a
mirror, this rather translates to a form of imagi-
nation. In the most general setting, there happens
to be the ability to imagine physically non-existing
(and possibly dynamic) scenes from an arbitrary
perspective. Then in the textual version, this would
correspond to the ability of virtually creating non-
existing entities and having hypothetical encoun-
ters/conversations with them. This can then possi-
bly be tied to the well-entertained theory of mind
concept, in which non-existent entities are then
models, previously created by the subject, of actual
entities. Note that, there still exists an ongoing
debate on whether self-recognition and theory of
mind concepts can be regarded as highly correlated
or not [32], but a gradual connection can definitely
be made as apparent in our example.
B. A comparative analysis
A comparative analysis is now given with respect
to Turing Test referring back to Section I-A. It is
not possible to fully address each item presented
in that section, as a more formal and rigorous
version of our methodology should be devised for
such a detailed consideration. Addressing the first
item, it is questionable whether consistent logical
systems will be capable of self-recognition or not
or whether paraconsistency is a requirement for
self-recognition, but such related claims need to
be considered rigorously as a future perspective.
However, as a self-contained test devoid of external
dependency, our methodology is capable of detect-
ing not just human-specific but a general form of
intelligence, perhaps being a precursor for higher
forms. There is no external judge that specifies the
outcome, but the testee judges oneself in a truly
objective manner. An observer is in fact needed to
record the success or failure of the test, but the
outcome of the test is independent of whether an
observer exists. As a final related note, there might
be a reasonable time limit (or number of turns) for
the testee to be deemed successful or not.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Although studies based on the visual version exist
as mention previously, to our knowledge there has
been no research on the textual version of the mirror
8test as proposed here. It is also a big question
whether chatbots, which have previously passed the
Turing test, will also be able to fulfill all of the
proposed stages depicted here.
Two approaches come to attention as possible
solutions to this textual version. A conventional
solution can be to integrate concepts that mirror
neurons provide with natural language processing
tools, thus providing solutions parallel to the ones
mentioned in II-B. As a mirror neuron is sensitive to
a form of action, in textual version, this corresponds
to a neuron sensitive to a pattern of text (whether
it be an input or output). This way, an agent may
able to detect that it is talking to itself if it ’has a
neuron’ that is sensitive to patterns of text that are
specific to the agent.
Another solution for the chatbot may be to figure
out a way to query the address of the memory cells
it occupies in an unsupervised way. That way, by
adequate querying it can then differentiate whether
the entity contacted is another physical entity or in
fact itself. This way a solution for even detecting
a perfect mimicker is possible. However, as noted
the chatbot needs to seek this address querying
behavior itself. If such address querying mechanism
is hardcoded then it defies the goal of the test to
begin with. It would then correspond to implanting
a perfectly working mirror self-recognition chip into
a monkey’s brain and watch it recognize itself in the
mirror.
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